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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a pleasure and a privilege to provide a few reflections on
Michael Newton's thought-provoking essay on "How the ICC
Threatens Treaty Norms." His article marks an important piece of
scholarship. It reflects significant concerns about the reach and
function of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that merit further
attention and explanation in ICC practice. Newton makes a
provocative argument. He argues that the ICC might undermine
sovereign law enforcement efforts and exceed its powers if it exercises
jurisdiction over American forces in Afghanistan or Israeli offenses in
the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. This argument is not entirely new.
It is part of a broader strand of critique that has been voiced against

* Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Leiden University. I
wish to thank Dr. Rod Rastan and Joseph Powderly for their valuable insights and
comments on this essay.
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the Court since the entry into force of the Rome Statute. 1 I approach
these critiques from a slightly different angle. I would argue that the
type of "threats"2 that he formulates are a sign that the ICC becomes
more effective, and that it functions, as it is supposed to worknamely as a system of accountability that induces pressures to
3
investigate and prosecute core crimes.
ICC critique has evolved in stages over the past decade. Initially,
the ICC was criticized for jurisdictional overreach in relation to third
parties. 4 The United States has led a global campaign to limit the
effects of ICC jurisdiction. The major arguments against these
concerns have been powerfully addressed in scholarship. 5 In the
start-up phase of the Court, the ICC avoided any jurisdictional
confrontation. It discarded many of the fears voiced against it by
powerful states. It
focused on situations with uncontested
jurisdictional titles, based on referrals of States Parties, the Security
Council (which can refer situations that occur in non-States Parties)
or voluntary acceptances of jurisdiction under Article 12 (3) of the
Rome Statute (The Statute). Investigations were limited to easy
targets: non-Western powers or non-armed groups. This has led to
criticisms in relation to under-reach, selectivity, or political bias. 6 The
Court was attacked by voices of the Global South for an undue focus
on Africa and its reluctance to investigate potential crimes committed
by major powers in Iraq or Libya. 7 The ICC justified this approach by
citing gravity considerations or resource constraints.

1.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998), entered into force July 1, 2002,
reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2.
On fears relating to international criminal justice, see Fr6d6ric M6gret,
The Anxieties ofInternationalCriminalJustice, 29 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 197 (2016).
3.
See Carsten Stahn, Evolution, Revolution or New Culture? The Changing

Anatomy of International Criminal Justice (And Some of Its Curiosities Culture), 15
INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1122-37 (2015).
4.
On ICC authority and the pacta tertiis rule, see Madeleine Morris, High

Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
13 (2001); David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An
American View, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 93 (1999).
5.
See Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 618
(2003); Gennady M. Danilenko, ICC Statute and Third States, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, VOL II 1871 (Antonio
Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); Fr6d~ric M6gret, Epilogue to an
Endless Debate: The InternationalCriminal Court's Third Party Jurisdiction and the
Looming Revolution of InternationalLaw, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 247 (2011); Michael
Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdictionover the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the
US Position, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 70 (2001).
6.
See William A. Schabas, The Banality of InternationalJustice, 11 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 545, 549 (2013).
7.
For an exploration of this critique, see Carsten Stahn, Justice Civilisatrice?

The ICC, Post-Colonial Theory, and Faces of 'the Local" in CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE
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In contemporary practice, the tide is shifting. The Court engages
increasingly with the conduct of Major Powers, either based on
territorial jurisdiction (e.g., Afghanistan-United States; GeorgiaRussia) or the nationality of defendants (e.g., Iraq-United Kingdom).
All of these situations are still at a relatively early stage of
proceedings. No individuals have been targeted. In certain contexts
(e.g., Palestine), it is still uncertain whether there will be any
investigations. The ICC will only act if there are no genuine domestic
investigations and prosecutions. Affected states have multiple options
to challenge ICC jurisdiction. But there are fears that the ICC may
threaten established protections and overstep its boundaries.
It is thus increasingly clear that the Court will be criticized for
whatever it does. 8 It will be blamed by one constituency if it acts, and
by another if it fails to act. I would argue, that this tension is not a
"negative," but a "positive" one. 9
Michael Newton's article deserves credit for highlighting some of
the difficult dilemmas that arise in the application of international
criminal justice in situations where crimes occur on the territory of a
State Party to the ICC Statute. The territorial state often faces
difficulties to investigate or prosecute, in light of capacity constraints
or impediments to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals (e.g.,
SOFAs or agreements under Article 98 of the Statute). At the same
time, state practice suggests that there is not always a full and
effective follow-up on violations by the state of the nationality of the
offender.10 The crucial question is how such accountability problems
should be addressed: through trust in the exercise of jurisdiction of
the state of the offender, or the prospect of ICC jurisdiction.
Newton makes a powerful argument in favor of the primacy of
domestic jurisdiction, based on bilateral treaty arrangements
between the territorial state and the state of the nationality of the
offender. Critics would argue that Newton's argument should be
rejected since it would enable states that are not party to the Statute,
such as the United States or Israel, to unilaterally preclude the ICC
from exercising jurisdiction. 11 The novelty of Newton's claim lies in
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS 46
(Christian de Vos, Sara Kendall & Carsten Stahn eds., 2015).
8.
See Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal
Court Cannot Win, 28 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 323 (2015).
9.
See Carsten Stahn, More than a Court, Less Than a Court, Several Courts
in One?: The InternationalCriminal Court in Perspective, in THE LAw AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT lxxxiii (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
10.
In the area of peace operations, several proposals have been made to
ensure that troop-contributing countries hold peacekeepers accountable for crimes
committed during UN peacekeeping operations. See Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein
(Secretary-General's Special Advisor), A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, $ 27, U.N.
Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005).
11.
See Alain Pellet, The PalestinianDeclaration and the Jurisdiction ol the
International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 981, 995 (2010); Yael Ronen,
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the fact that he challenges ICC jurisdiction from the perspective of
treaty law and the theory of delegation. 12 He claims that the ICC
cannot exercise jurisdiction in cases where the State Party had
"contracted out" certain types of jurisdiction at the time of accession
to the Statute. He invokes the old Latin maxim from property law
"nemo dat quod non habet" to support this claim.
I would argue that this claim merits differentiation. I will focus
on three key issues. My first concern is that Newton misrepresents
the foundation of ICC authority. He derives ICC jurisdiction entirely
from theories of delegation, while disregarding alternative
universalist foundations. Although it might be politically sensitive for
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties in
contexts such as Afghanistan or Palestine, this option is not
necessarily precluded by international law. Second, Newton
overstretches the implications of the nemo dat quod non habet
doctrine. I would argue that the conflict that Newton describes raises
an enforcement problem, rather than an authority problem. A closer
distinction needs to be drawn between "prescriptive jurisdiction" and
''enforcement jurisdiction." A contractual arrangement of a territorial
entity with a third state, such as a SOFA, limits the exercise of
jurisdiction (i.e., enforcement). But it does not necessarily extinguish
the prescriptive jurisdiction of that entity (i.e., the general power to
assert jurisdiction). Third, I would argue that the situations in
Afghanistan and Palestine pose different problems from the
perspective of the nemo dat quod non habet argument. They must be
more closely distinguished.
A. Universalist v. Delegation-BasedFoundationsof ICC Jurisdiction
Newton's starting point is compelling. ICC authority is grounded
in state consent. The Statute is designed to strengthen domestic
jurisdiction. Many agree that it should ideally be interpreted in
harmony, rather than in conflict with other treaties. Article 98 of the
Statute confirms the intention of the drafters to limit legal conflicts
between the application of the ICC Statute and other international
agreements. But the conclusion that Newton draws, namely that
obligations under bilateral agreements should prevail over ICC's
13
jurisdiction, is open to challenge.
The ICC Statute is a special type of multilateral treaty. The
fundamental premise of the Statute goes beyond protection of
Israel,Palestine and the ICC-TerritoryUncharted but Not Unknown, 12 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 7, 23-24 (2014).
12.
For previous discussions of the delegation theory in relation to Palestine,
see Eugene Kontorovich, Israel/Palestine-TheICC's Uncharted Territory, 11 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 979, 989-92 (2013); Yuval Shany, In Defence of Functional Interpretation
of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 329, 331-33 (2010).
13.
See Ronen, supra note 11, at 2 1-24.
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sovereignty and state interests. It is geared at the protection of
individuals and the establishment of a system of justice. This is
reflected in the preamble in which States Parties express their
commitment to "guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of
international justice." 14 The treaty is thus more than the sum of its
parts. 15 It affirms the obligation of states, namely "the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
17
international crimes." 16 It is grounded in the idea of a jus puniendi.
It makes sovereignty answerable. This is reflected in the regime of
complementarity. Complementarity is not a mere protection of state
sovereignty. It does not mean primacy of state jurisdiction, in the
sense of a right, as implied by Newton, but the "primary
responsibility" of states. It is more in line with the idea of
"sovereignty as responsibility." 18 The exercise of domestic jurisdiction
is tied to the ability and willingness to deliver justice. This
responsibility needs to be taken into account in the assessment of
treaty regimes. States Parties entrusted the Court to have a final say
over certain issues, including the question whether or not the Court is
entitled to exercise jurisdiction. Conflicts of jurisdiction are no longer
bilateral matters but subject to the legal order of the ICC, and its
methods of treaty interpretation, in the relationship between the
Court and its Parties.
Newton submits that ICC authority is exclusively derived from
an act of delegation, which requires two elements: the power of the
affected state to exercise jurisdiction, and a delegation of that power
to the ICC. But this is not the entire truth. The delegation theory is
not the only model to explain ICC jurisdiction. 19 According to an
alternative model, ICC jurisdiction is not derived from the territorial
or national jurisdiction of a specific state, 20 but grounded in a broader
entitlement of states and the international legal community under
international law. This theory posits that the normative justification

14.
Rome Statute, supra note 1.
15.
See M6gret, supra note 5, at 260.
16.
Rome Statute, supra note 1.
17.
See Kai Ambos, Punishment Without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue
of International Criminal Law: A First Contribution Towards a Consistent Theory of
InternationalCriminal Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.293 (2013).
See generally Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: PoliticalRhetoric or
18.
Emerging Legal Norm, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2007). On complementarity as
responsibility, see Rod Rastan, Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration?, in
FOR CORE
COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 83, 97-88 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2010).
19.
As aptly noted by Yuval Shany, the "actual reach of the ICC depends on
the combined effect of its delegation-based and universalistic jurisdictional powers.
Cutting one 'branch' of jurisdiction would leave the ICC with truncated capabilities for
fulfilling its mandate." Shany, supra note 12, at 337.
On the "universalistic view," see Shany, supranote 12, at 331.
20.
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21
of punishment is independent of the will of the respective sovereign.
It receives support from the fact that individuals face direct
individual criminal responsibility under international law for
international crimes. 22 States exercise this jurisdiction on behalf of
the international community. 23 According to this logic, ratification of
the Statute does not necessarily establish a title for ICC jurisdiction.
It rather authorizes, as Antonio Cassese put it, "the ICC to substitute
itself for a consenting state, which would thus waive its right to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction." 24 Following this reading, the
authority of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction does not depend on a
corresponding domestic jurisdictional title of the state. The act of
accession to the Statute merely activates the power of the ICC to
exercise a jurisdiction grounded in international law. Jurisdictional
constraints encountered by the acceding state do not necessarily
affect the jurisdictional title of the ICC.

B. Limits of the Nemo Dat Quo Non Habet Doctrine
A second weakness of Newton's argument is that he
overstretches the application of the nemo dat quo non habet doctrine.
1. Limits of the Symmetry Requirement
Newton argues that a State Party must have jurisdictional
authority at the time of the alleged offense. He implies that there
must be a symmetry between ICC jurisdiction and domestic
jurisdiction since the former derives from the latter. This assumption
is questionable. International criminal jurisdiction is typically meant
to complement certain gaps in domestic jurisdiction. It is misleading
to assert that the ICC can only exercise those jurisdictional titles that
a state holds in its domestic setting. The jurisdictional titles of the
ICC under Article 12 reflect archetypes of state jurisdiction. But, as
correctly noted by Rod Rastan, "the Court does not have to establish
the existence of matching legislation at the national level before its

21.
International criminal justice differs from domestic criminal law. One of its
specificities is that the State is not always "a defender of law and order," but "the
principal perpetrator of crimes." See Lawrence Douglas, Truth and Justice in Atrocity
Trials, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 34, 36
(William Schabas ed., 2016).
Note that even the Nuremberg Tribunal could be conceptualized in
22.
different ways, i.e. as an entity acting on behalf of the international community or as
an entity with delegated national jurisdiction of the Allied Powers. See Scharf, supra
note 5, at 103-09.
23.
In particular, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is based on the idea
that states act as trustees of humankind based on the nature, i.e. the gravity of the
crime.

24.

Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court: Some

PreliminaryReflections, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 144, 160 (1999).
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jurisdiction can be exercised in a particular case." 25 Such a reading
would deprive international criminal justice of much of its function.
The very rationale of accession to the Rome Statute may lie in the
prospect that it offers greater options of prescription and enforcement
jurisdiction.
The idea that there must be exact symmetry between ICC
jurisdiction and domestic jurisdiction goes against the rationale of
complementarity. Article 17 of the Statute foresees that a State may
be found inactive or unable because it cannot prosecute a certain
crime. This may arise, for instance, if that State has no domestic
prohibition for a particular conduct. It would be strange if the ICC,
which is supposed to fill the gap left by State inaction, would itself be
deprived of competence because of the same domestic deficiency.
The more plausible reading is that the ability of the ICC to
exercise jurisdiction is grounded in the competence of the state to
adhere to treaties, rather than delegation of equivalent jurisdictional
titles by the state. Any other reading would lead to absurd results. It
would imply that the ICC regime is subject to constant uncertainty,
since it derives authority from the domestic realm. The ICC would
lose its own jurisdiction, when a state loses its title to jurisdiction.
Such a vision was rejected by States Parties. The overwhelming
majority of states during the negotiations accepted the idea of
"automatic jurisdiction." 26 Consent to the acceptance and exercise of
jurisdiction were integrated into one act. This means that the ICC is
automatically entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the core crimes
once a state becomes a party to the Statute. No additional consent or
parallelism of jurisdictional titles is necessary.
Such an understanding is fully consistent with the nullum
crimen sine lege principle (Art. 22 of the Statute). Human rights law
does not require the ICC to verify whether a person can be tried in his
or her own domestic court, even if ICC proceedings concern nationals
of third-party states. 27 This follows from the international crime
exception in Article 15 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides a title for "trial and punishment of
any person" for conduct that is "criminal according to the general
28
principles of law recognized by the community of nations."

25.
Rod Rastan, The Jurisdictional Scope of Situations Before the
InternationalCriminal Court, 23 CRIM. L. F. 1, 20 (2012).
26.
See William Schabas, Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise of
Jurisdiction,in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE 277, 280-82 (William Schabas ed., 2010).
See Danilenko, supra note 5, at 1884.
27.
28.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art.
15(2), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Jurisdiction

and

Newton's argument is further open to critique since it pays
insufficient attention to the distinction between prescriptive
jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is typically divided into two types: the jurisdiction to
prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. 29 The first one concerns the
capacity of a state to "make its law applicable to the activities,
30
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things."
The second one governs the power of a state to "to enforce or compel
compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or
regulations." 3 1 Jurisdiction to enforce is typically territorial, while
jurisdiction to prescribe can be extraterritorial.
A strong argument can be made that the bilateral jurisdictional
treaty regimes that Newton discusses (e.g., SOFAS, Oslo II) limit the
jurisdiction to enforce, but not the jurisdiction to prescribe. 3 2 This
means that the respective state would retain the authority to vest the
ICC with jurisdiction, although it is limited in its own jurisdiction to
enforce. This argument is in line with general jurisdictional theories
under international law.
As Yuval Shany rightly points out:
The right to delegate jurisdiction is reflective of an internationally recognized
legal authority, and not of the material ability of actually exercising
jurisdiction over either the territory in question or over certain individuals
33
within or outside that territory.

Any other conception would have detrimental consequences for
international law. It would imply that a state that is unable to
exercise jurisdiction over specific parts of its territory would lose its
ability to investigate or prosecute offenders or to seize an
international jurisdiction with the power to try offenders. This would
create significant accountability gaps.
The question as to whether the respective state (e.g.,
Afghanistan, Palestine) has the capacity to delegate jurisdiction to

29.

See Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction:Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2

J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735, 736-37 (2004).
30.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).

31.
32.

Id. § 401(c).
See Kai Ambos, Palestine, UN Non-Member Observer Status and ICC

Jurisdiction, EJIL: TALK! (May 6, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-un-nonmember-observer-status-and-icc-jurisdiction/
[https://perma.cc/G56L-2ZK7] (archived
Feb. 20, 2016); Ronen, supra note 11, at 21-22.
33.
See Shany, supra note 12, at 339.
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the ICC is not a matter that is governed by the bilateral agreements.
34
It depends on the objective status of the territory.
Sovereignty typically creates a presumption in favor of territorial
jurisdiction. In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice famously held that the "title to exercise jurisdiction rests in
its sovereignty." 35 Bilateral immunity agreements that award
exclusive jurisdiction over specific categories of persons to another
state do not extinguish the general capacity of the contracting state to
allocate jurisdiction to another entity. If anything, such agreements
demonstrate the inherent or pre-existing competence of the State to
exercise such jurisdiction. Delegation merely constrains the exercise
of domestic jurisdiction. The general prescriptive jurisdiction in
relation to international crimes cannot be contracted out.
This understanding is reflected in the structure of the ICC
Statute. It addresses conflicts with bilateral agreements not in Part 2
of the Statute, which deals with jurisdictional issues, but in Part 9,
which governs cooperation. The fact that Article 98 forms part of Part
9 of the Statute confirms the theory that drafters viewed conflicting
obligations under SOFA arrangements as an enforcement, rather
than a jurisdictional problem. As it was correctly noted elsewhere:
"The raison d'6tre for Article 98 is recognition that the Court has and
is exercising jurisdiction with respect to a particular person
36
sought."
Article 98 deals with the question to what obligations are States
Parties bound. 3 7 It regulates both the obligations of States and the
conduct of the ICC towards such a state. However, Article 98 does not
govern the way in which the ICC exercises its jurisdiction. ICC
jurisdiction is governed by Article 12 and Article 27, which state that
immunities shall not bar the exercise of jurisdiction. 3 8 It is irrelevant
to ICC jurisdiction whether there is an Article 98 agreement. Article
98 is only relevant to identifying whether there is a surrender
obligation to which that particular State can be held accountable. 39
If a state has conferred jurisdiction to the ICC, despite a previous
bilateral treaty arrangement limiting domestic jurisdiction, the
resolution of conflicting obligations becomes an issue of
complementarity and cooperation. The ICC is not bound by the
agreement of the State Party. It does therefore not have to apply the

34.
See Yael Ronen, ICC Jurisdictionover Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip, 8
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 3, 19 (2010).
35.
SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19.
36.
Rod Rastan, Jurisdiction, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 141, 162 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
37.
Article 98 is placed in Part 9 which deals with the obligations of States
Parties to cooperate fully. See Article 86 of the Statute.
38.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27 (2).
39.
See Article 98 (The "Court may not proceed with a request for surrender
which...").
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rule lex specialis derrogat lex generalis. It will instead have to assess
whether there are any domestic investigations or not. In case of
inaction, the ICC is generally competent to proceed with its own
investigations and prosecution. 40 Relevant states have the option to
challenge admissibility under Article 19 of the Statute. The options of
ICC enforcement depend on the interpretation of the scope of Article
98 (2), 4 1 which limits the ability of the Court to request the arrest
and surrender of a person.
C. SituationalDifferences
I would agree with Newton that the ICC has not been very
explicit in explaining its reasoning for jurisdiction in relation to
Afghanistan and Palestine. Both situations are under preliminary
examination by the Prosecutor. This assessment precedes any
investigations. It encompasses different phases: initial assessment of
all information on alleged crimes received under article 15 ("Phase
1"), analysis of jurisdiction ("Phase 2"), analysis of complementarity
and gravity ("Phase 3") and interest of justice considerations ("Phase
4"). Palestine is currently at Phase 2, Afghanistan at Phase 3.42 The
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) analysis engages inter alia with
potential crimes committed by Israeli nationals 4 3 and U.S. 44 armed
forces. But it does not set out an explicit basis for jurisdiction.
In my view, the reasoning needs to differentiate between the two
contexts. The case of Afghanistan is rather straightforward.
Afghanistan is a sovereign state. It has a jurisdictional title inherent
in statehood. The jurisdiction to prescribe was not contracted out by
any SOFA. This implies that the nemo dat quo non habet argument
does not cause any conflict in relation to ICC jurisdiction.

40.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1); Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC01/04-01/07 OA8, Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga
Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of
the Case,
78 (Sept. 25, 2009) ("[Inn considering whether a case is inadmissible under
article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial questions to ask are (1) whether
there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there have been
investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned.").
41.
On the controversial issue of whether Article 98(2) covers only pre-existing
or also "new" SOFA agreements, see Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 98, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 2144-46
(Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2015).
42.
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Report on
Preliminary Examination Activities (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.inticcdocs/
otp/OTP-PErep-2015-Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QNL-ZRSY] (archived Feb. 20, 2016).
43.
Id.
63 et seq. (including Gaza, the West Bank and Jerusalem).
44.
Id. $ 120 (relating to the bombardment of the Midecins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) hospital in Kunduz).
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The Palestinian situation, however, is more far more complex. 4 5
As noted earlier, I would defend the view that ICC jurisdiction can be
established by virtue of the ability of Palestine to adhere to treaties
as a state, irrespective of whether Palestine is able to exercise such
jurisdiction domestically under the Oslo accords. But the argument
becomes more difficult if one takes the view that ICC jurisdiction can
only be asserted through a delegation of jurisdiction that matches a
domestic title, as claimed by Newton. Then the decisive question is
who delegated what to whom.
Israel might claim that it delegated jurisdictional authority to an
entity created by the Oslo accord, called the "Palestinian Authority,"
and that the Palestinian Authority could not vest the ICC with
criminal jurisdiction over Israeli citizens and territorial jurisdiction
over "Area C" in the West Bank since it does not itself possess such
jurisdiction under the Oslo Accords. Accordingly, the Palestinian
Authority could only transfer criminal jurisdiction with respect to the
conduct of its own nationals or other non-Israelis. 46 Israel might
invoke Article 98 of the ICC Statute to support the view that
international crimes can be excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC
47
through a bilateral arrangement.
Palestine might claim that it always had a legal title of its own
that dates back to the Mandate period, 48 and that this title existed at
the time of Oslo, even if it was not recognized by Israel. It might
claim that this title was recognized in UN practice, at the latest at
the date of the UN vote in the General Assembly on 29 November
2012, which granted Palestine non-member observer State status in
the United Nations. 49 It could argue that Oslo does not extinguish
this title since it only provides a temporary waiver of criminal
jurisdiction over Israeli nationals under Oslo. 50 ICC authority would
thus be grounded in a genuine Palestinian title of jurisdiction. A
further argument could be made that the exclusion of Israelis from
Palestinian criminal jurisdiction does not apply to certain
international crimes, since conduct proscribed under the ICC Statute
is of international concern and gives rise to pre-existing treaty

45.
For an account, see Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court,
Situation in Palestine:Summary of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged by
the Palestinian National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements (May 3, 2010),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/553F5F08-2A84-43E9-8197-6211B5636FEA/28285
2/PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H44-S62V] (archived Feb. 20,
2016).
46.
See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 989-991.
47.
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3

5
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